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Draft Recommendation
on peacekeeping and security in Atrtca
The Assembly,
(, Conscious of the historical ties and strategic interests binding Europe to Africa;
(ii) Declaring its support for the framing of a European policy on Africa;
(iii) Concerned about the absence of any reference to African problems in the Rome and Bremen
minist€rial declarations ;
(iv) Disappointed by the slowness some member countries are showing in responding to the Coun-
cil's efforts to coordinate their cooperation programmes with Africa;
(v) Deeply concerned by the proliferation of crises in sub-Saharan Africa;
(vi) Welcoming the progress a number of countries have made in terms of their economic and social
developme,nt and the establishment of democratic institutions;
(vit) Aware that social and economic prosperity and the existence of democratic institutions are not
only the most important factors for promoting peaceful international relations and the internal stability
of individual countries but also help the culture and traditions of the peoples of those countries to flour-
ish;
(viii) Convinced that owing to its historical involvement in Africa, Europe has a special responsibility
to promote social and economic development, peace and security on that continent;
(ix) Recognising the crucial role incumbent on the OAU for the purpose of maintaining peace and
security in Africa and the fact that subregional organisations have a stabilising influence in promoting
cooperation between states and economic and social development;
(x) Recalling that any action taken to settle conflicts and restore peace should be consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations;
(xt) Noting that many sub-Satraran conflicts arc aggravated by illegal arms traffrcking and the ac-
tivities of mercenaries;
(xii) Convinced that peacekeeping and security in Africa are closely linked to the economic and social
development of the countries of the continent and to the strengthening of democratic institutions in sub-
Satraran Africa;
(xiii) Recognising the beneficial effects of the work churches, religious associations and NGOs are
doing on the ground with a view to promoting civilian societies in African countries,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.JNCIL
l. Continue to monitor African problems closely with a view to framing a proper European policy
on sub-Saharan Africa;
2. Cooperate closely with the European Union in order to place such a policy in the context of the
CFSP in the longer term while at the same time giving it an economic and social dimension, and 
- 
more
particularly 
- 
enhance cooperation with the EU for the purpose of preparing for the Euro-African
summit in 2000;
3. Continue to promote and support the transition to democracy in African countries, this being
essential for the stabilisation of the continent as a whole in the perspective of a global concept of secu-
rity;
4. Further the cooperation prograrnmes each European country has with African countries;
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5. Urge the member countries to become more involved in endeavours designed to coordinate their
programmes of cooperation with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa so as to develop a European pol-
icy on Africa;
6. Establish a programme of cooperation rvith the OAU covering the following aspects in particular:
(a) cooperation with the Torrejon Satellite Centre mainly so that it can provide African authori-
ties managing situations on the ground with reports on the development of crises;
(b) training prograrnmes for OAU officials, armed forces and police forces in the sub-Saharan
countries, with a view to making a bigger contribution to the prevention and settlement of crises;
(c) a programme to fight arms trafficking;
(d) cooperation between the WEU Planning Cell and the OAU conflict-management centre;
@ greater WEU involvement in peacekeeping exercises organised in Africa, with the possible
participation of the Planning Cell in their preparation;
7. Support any efforts made by WEU member countries in bilateral trade and intemational relations
to fight the proliferation of, and trafficking in, arms with particular reference to anti-personnel mines;
8. Adopt, in cooperation with the OAU and the relevant countries, a prograrnme of ongoing support
for African endeavours to clear anti-personnel mines;
9. Study the possibility of European advisers providing support, under the auspices of WEU, for
peacekeeping operations in Africa and envisage logistic support for such operations;
10. React without delay, within the framework of the resources available to WEU and in cooperation
with the OAU, in order to support peace initiatives taken in response to emergency situations.
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Explanatory Memorandum.
(submitted by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The close ties forged by history, geo-
graphic proximity, common interests and, to a
large extent, culture mean that Africa and Europe
cannot afford to ignore each other. It therefore
comes as no surprise that, since making its en-
trance on the world stege, Africa has been seen
as being inextricably linked with Europe. More-
over, for a long time it was politically and of
course economically dependent on Europe. Even
though Africa is forttrnately no longer under the
yoke of colonialism, strong ties continue to exist
between the two continents, one with its former
colonial powers and the other with their colonies
of old which in most cases share the language,
religion, economic interests and quite often the
democratic ideals of their former masters who, as
we well know, very often exploited them. Fur-
thermore, the presence of a very large number of
Europeans on what was known for so long as the
"Dark Continent" together with an increasing
number of Africans in search of a better future in
Europe has created a climate of Euro-African
rapprochement based on personal ties and shared
interests which compound the links between
states and enhance the feeling of interdepend-
ence between these two continental neighboursr.
2. Opening the colloquy held by the Assem-
bly of WEU in Lisbon on 15 September 1998,
the President of the Portuguese National Assem-
bly stressed the obligations Europeans had to-
wards Africans on account of slavery, the
wrongs they suffered during the colonial penod
and the profound upheavals to which they were
subjected through having had forced upon them a
large dose of Western culture including the no-
tion of ownership, the concept of the state, lang-
uage and even religion. Mr Ant6nio de Almeida
Santos also pointed out that a number of the
problems plaguing modernday Africa could be
attributed either to conquests by European coun-
tries (for instance, the artificial way in which
borders were drawn up, dividing peoples betrveen
two and sometimes three states) or to illicit ac-
-t 
So as.*bly Document 1566, wEU's contribu-
tion to reinforcing peace in central Africa, Rappor-
teur: Mr Masseret, 15 May 1997.
tivities in some sectors of Western society (arms
trafficking in particular). He also argued that
progress in advancing the cause of democracy
throughout the continent and the economic and
social development of its countries could make a
decisive contribution to overcoming the present
crises and promoting the continent's security.
When drawing conclusions from the colloquy de-
bates, the President of the Assembly stressed that
all the European institutions, and more par-
ticularly the European Union and WEU, should
be involved in a European policy on Africa. Mr
de Puig added that one ofthe objectives of such a
policy should be to promote the economic and
social development of African countries and their
transition to democracy2.
3. Your Rapporteur shares this analysis:
history has put an obligation on Europeans to
concern themselves with African matters. More-
over, certain vital interests common to the two
parties also make this a necessity and the former
colonial powers 
- 
most of whom now regret past
deeds 
- 
not only have a thorough knowledge of
African problems but also possess the means
necessary for taking action where circumstances
so require 
- 
in cooperation, of course, with the
Organisation of African Unity and in accordance
with the United Nations Charter.
4. In this report, which draws on the ex-
tremely valuable debate at the Lisbon Colloquy,
a considerable effort has been made to describe
the main events since September 1998 that have
influenced the present situation in Africa, in or-
der to arrive at conclusions. However, in line
with the rationale followed at the colloquy, this
particular analysis of events focuses on sub-
Satraran Africa which, from the historical, socio-
cultural and economic angles, constitutes a some-
what special case. Furthermore, it should be
borne in mind that Europe's strong ties and close
relations with north Africa are also relevant in
this connection as are the important relations
existing between that region and sub-Saharan
Africa 
- 
these aspects have already been dis-
cussed in two previous reports on security in the
--S." th" offrcial record of the colloquy on peace-
keeping and security in Africa.
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Mediterranean region, submitted to the Assembly
by Mr de Lipkorvski and your Rapporteut'.
5. It would be inappropriate to conclude this
introduction without stressing that despite the
proliferation of flashpoints in Africa, the exis-
tence of dictatorships and coups d'dtat, the suc-
cession of humanitarian disasters, endemic dis-
eases such as malaria and the recent spread of
AIDS, poverty and famine 
- 
all of which have
brought and continue to bring endless suffering
to many peoples, the overall image of the conti-
nent today is far from being entirely negative.
The fact that countries as important as Nigeria
have become democracies, that key states such as
Mozambique and Uganda have restored a peace-
ful order and made substantial economic and
social progress, that other countries such as Togo
and Ghana have also improved their economies
and that there are stable democratic institutions
in Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Benin,
Mali and South Africa gives cause for hope and
shows that the peoples of Africa have both the
resolve and ability to build a better future. Timid
though this hope may be, there is nonetheless
reason to describe it as realistic and justified by
the progress the Organisation of African Unity
has made in the field of peacekeeping and secu-
rity. The task facing Europe, and more particu-
larly WEU, is to fulfil what is a historical and
humanitarian duty 
- 
within the hmits of their
possibilities. In so dorng, Europeans will also be
acting in full conformity with the interests they
have to defend.
II. The general situation in Africa
and its subregions
6. Unfortunately 1998 was a year that saw a
fresh outbreak of conflicts in Africa, putting a
damper on the cautious optimism experts whose
job it is to analyse the situation on that continent
and especially its sub-Saharan region had begun
to show in recent years. The instability that is
virtually ubiquitous is decimating populations
and to a large extent undoing all the hard work
put in over the last decade to promote economic
development and political democratisation, the
fruits of which are there to see in a number of
countries. For although crises abound in and
-'Do*..rs 
1543 of 4 November 1996 and 1371 of
24May 1993.
among a very large number of states (a quarter of
the sub-Saharan countries according to the 1998-
99 annual report of the lntemational Institute for
Strategic Studies), this does not detract from the
progress made in other countries. Furthermore, it
has to be remembered that the fundamental cause
of Africa's problems continues to be the low
level of human development as defined by the
United Nations (life expectancy, level of educa-
tion and living standards). Most countries are
caught up in this situation and, with some rare
exceptions, the human development index in
Africa is below 0.499, one of the lowest in the
worlda. An outline of the situation in each
subregion and in more detail for each country
will perhaps provide a clearer picture of the gen-
eral state of affairs on the sub-Saharan subconti-
nent.
(a) llest Africa
7. 1998 was not an easy year for West Africa
- 
already affected by the devaluation of the CFA
franc, the region had to contend with difficult
climatic conditions (drought in a number of areas
and too much rain in others) and the effects of
the Asian cnsis.
8. However, there were some positive devel-
opments such as rn Guinea where, following an
abortive putsch in 1996, peaceful elections were
held in December 1998. The country's economy
showed signs of picking up mainly in the agricul-
tural and mining sectors.
9. Senegal also maintained growth at 5Yo but
had a considerable economic burden to bear ow-
ing to its intervention in Guinea-Bissau. Its fish-
ing industry was badly affected by the devalua-
tion of the currencies of its Asian competitors.
10. The Gambia re-established normal rela-
tions not only with its neighbours but also with
many non-African nations (such as the Com-
monwealth countries) and this enabled it to sus-
tain its development drive.
I l. Despite its isolated geographic position,
Cape Verde b economic and social development
in a context of well established democracy con-
tinues to be satisfactory. The government's deci-
sion to tie its currency to the Portuguese escudo
(under the agreements of 13 March 1998 provid-
rUnit"a Nutions Dwelopment Plan, 1997 report.
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ing for a fixed exchange rate guaranteed by Lis-
bon) was an encouraging sign.
12. Burkina Faso can be taken as an example
of sound public management and political stabil-
ity even though it barely has an economy because
of its unfavourable geographic position and
sc:lrce natural resources. Nevertheless there is an
undercurrent of tension in the country mainly
because of the suspect circumstances surround-
ing the death in December 1998 of the freelance
journalist, Robert Zorgos .
13. Mali expeienced political uprisings in
1997 and 1998 but they did not undermine the
democratic process. From the economic point of
view, it is now the biggest cotton-producing
country in the region and has become self-suffi-
cient in rice thanks to an effective irrigation pro-
gramme.
14. Security, law and order have been restored
in the north of Niger but the country still faces a
worrying food shortage. The coup d'6tat by the
presidential guard which toppled President Bar6
Mainassara and also resulted in his death could,
if the international community applies pressure,
lead to the country becoming a democracy given
that the new, interim President, Mallan Wank6,
has promised to hold general elections by the end
of the year.
15. Ghana has managed to overcome its own
shortages and the economy is starting to grow
despite the drought and lack of electricity which
have led to a considerable slowdown in ouput.
16. Benin has had to contend with the same
problems but now that it has a democratic system
which has already seen two changes of govem-
ment, it is pushing ahead with economic reforms,
particularly in the area of privatisation, with
satisfactory results
17. Togo bas managed to come back up to the
level of income it had prior to the political crisis
in the early 1990s, in spite of the impact of the
drought and the political situation which is not
problem-free6.
18. Since the death of President Abacha who
brought in a military dictatorship, Nigeria, the
I Su t" lrtonde, 4 May 1999: "Robert Zongo dies in
the afternoon".
6 See Amnesty International's report of 5 May 1999
in which it refers to serious human rights violations.
giant in West Africa, has fortunately at last en-
tered a period of transition to democracy that
holds promise for the entire region and is even of
crucial importance for Africa as a whole. How-
ever, the country's economy is suffering because
of shifting oil prices and the cost of peacekeeping
operations in which it is involved.
19. The economy in COte d'Ivoire picked up
with a growttr rate of 6% n 1998 even though
the regional context is difficult and the effects of
the Asian crisis have made themselves felt. But
the country's huge public deficit is a millstone.
20. From this brief overview of the region,
your Rapporteur believes he can draw the general
conclusion that a certain degree of stability seems
to have set in in West Africa despite one major
crisis flashpoint, namely Sierra Leone.
(b) Central Africa
21. There is great instability in Central Africa,
a region that is vital for the balance of the Afri-
can continent. The main cause at present is the
upheaval in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) Yet other countries are continuing their
efforts to promote economic development with
some success, among them Equatorial Guinea
whose oil-producing activities have taken on
increasing importance. Still on the positive side,
Cameroon arrd Gabon are politically and eco-
nomically stable despite being surrounded by the
crises in the DRC and the Central African Re-
public. [n contrast, Chad, whtch recently em-
erged from a crisis lasting several years and
whose government claims to want to tighten pub-
lic spending in 1999, is on the brink of a fresh
civil war. The relative degree of stability some
states have achieved could be undermined by the
serious conflicts in neighbouring countries such
as the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, or the Central
African Republic (CAR) Finally, there is the
situation in Sdo Tomd e Principe where a cohab-
itation arrangement, albeit seemingly precarious,
is operating between the President and govern-
ment and where tle economy remains weak
owing to a lack of natural resources in spite of
the possibility of oil lying offshore.
(c) Southern Afri"a
22. There is no doubt that the Republic of
South Africa dominates this region both on ac-
count of its size and economic power. The elec-
6
tions due to be held in 1999 could mark the end
of the country's long period of transition follolv-
ing the drsintegration of the apartheid regime.
The economy was dealt a harsh blow by the 1998
financial crisis and growth has slowed to a rate
of 0.2Yo. However, it should pick up again this
year. The country also suffers from problems
such as high levels of crime in some big cities.
On the positive side, one of South Africa's note-
worthy achievements is the major Blue Crane
peacekeeping exercise that took place in the
country in April under South African leadership.
It involved 5 000 troops from 12 southem Afri-
can countries and was considered a success'.
Neighbouring Botswana can boast very good
economic results and a stable political climate.
23. Conversely, Namibia s economy has suf-
fered on account of its military intervention in the
DRC and President Nujoma is facing growrng
resistance to such intervention. Following a pe-
riod of tension in 1997 and early 1998, the politi-
cal situation tn Zambia appears to have returned
to normal. Zimbabwe is experiencing political
and social tension due to the structural weakness
of its economy which has also been aggravated
by military intervention in the DRC. In Swazi-
land,where the process of democratisation is at a
standstill, economic problems are causing social
tension. The country's growth rate (which stood
between 2.5 and 3Yo in 1998) is still not suffi-
cient to cope with the big increase in its popula-
tion (the increase in the birth rate was close on
5% n 1998). ln Malawi the political debate be-
came tougher in the run-up to the May 1999
elections. But the country is pressing ahead with
its reforms (in particular the privatisation pro-
gramme) and economic growth stands at 4.5o/o.
24. Finally, tn Mozambique, which has en-
joyed stability since the conclusion of the 1992
peace accords, the economy is in full swing. This
country could be described as a showcase of
economic and political stabilisation in a climate
of peace. Even the continuing tension between
the Frelimo and Renamo rebel movements does
not appear to be a threat to peace and internal
security in the country which, though still very
poor, is nonetheless beginning to look attractive
to investors. ln 1998, it was granted an excep-
T 5"" t" tttorde,25 Ap.iil 1999.
tional reduction in its foreign
ment reached on creating the
corridor and the continuing
The agree-
transport
gramme should draw new i . Mozam-
bique's growth rate in 1998 at lj%6.lnfla-
tion is under control and i output is ris-
ing A point worth noting is
Bassa dam, built by Portugal, i
port hydroelectric power to
tries.
25. Turning to the
cause for concem, the political
some US$ 500 million. Kenya
tend with a huge public deficit
ya shillings in 1998). Although
involved in the conflict in the
address the problem of ethni
movements in the north (the
the Cahora
beginning to ex-
ring coun-
greater
in Leso-
x of refugees
gripping the
inst the Ameri-
has to con-
140 billion Ken-
has been
and has to
motivated rebel
Lord's Reform
tho is very tense while in the long-stand-
ing war between the People's for the
Liberation of Angola (MP and Unita has
flared up once again, even
leave the country.
tlN troops to
(d) East Africa
26. In recent years Tanzania shown itself
capable of sound economic
stability does not seem to be
and its
threat, at least
for the moment, from the large i
from Burundi or from the
independent island of Zanzibar the oppo-
sition is contesting the results f the 1995 elec-
stability whichions. Kenya also enjoys
does not appear to be undermi by the crises in
neighbouring countries. The
shocked by the bomb attack
was deeply
can Embassy on7 August 1998 caused the
death of 250 people and amounting to
Army 
- 
LRA) and west (the Democratic
Forces 
- 
FDA) of the country, i has continued to
appears to have
should however
in the country's
implement economic reforms
consolidated political stability.
be noted that regular increases
defence spending are beginning
the economy.
put a strain on
27. Even though East
that there is no immediate
countries referred to above,
is fortunate in
ris in the three
region's overall
balance appears to be fragile mainly
because of the extremely ins situation in
neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi Sudan
pro-
DOCUMENT 1648
(e) The Horn olAfriaa
28. This region of great strategic importance
has traditionally been beset by conflicts. [t was
prey to rivalry between the colonial, then post-
colonial powers and finally between the two
superpowers during the cold war. The Horn of
Africa is still prone to great instability as a result
of the tribal war tn Somalia that has been going
on for a number of years and the conflict between
Eritrea and Ethiopia (which itself has to contend
with rebel Islamist movements and the Oromo
Liberation Front). Djibouti has to get used to a
smaller French military presence in the country
but has seen a boom in its exports to Ethiopia (it
provides landlocked Ethiopia with all-important
access to the sea).
(fl The Indian Ocean
29. Fortunately, both the Seychelles andMad-
agascar have stable political climates, in contrast
to the group of islands forming the Republic of
Comoros which, following the secesion of the
island of Nzwani, is facing serious economic
problerns that threaten to undermine its stability.
Indeed, they partly account for the crisis affecti-
ng the country's unity. The OAU is persisting
with its efforts to find a peaceful solution to keep
the country together by mediating between the
Nzwani separatists 
- 
of whom it is critical 
- 
and
the legal government. ln 1998, the island of
Nzwani adopted a constitution by referendum.
The military expedition led by the federal auth-
orities w:N a failure. Nzrvani requested its re-
attachment to France, which considered the re-
quest unrealistic. As the crisis threatened to
escalate, the OAU appointed Mr Mandela to lead
a mediation effort for the purpose of stabilising
the situation. Despite a guarantee to the effect
that the Comoros franc will continue to be in-
dexed on the French franc after the tranisition to
the euro, the country's economy remains very
weak. On 23 April 1999, the representatives of
the various islands in the archipelago concluded
an agreement on a Union to replace the federal
State but the Nzwani delegation refused to sign
it. Protests and violent dernonstrations in the
capital, Moroni, ensued. Faced with this unstable
situation the army, accusing the President and
government of being too accommodating with the
separatists, seized power under the command of
its commander-in-chief, Colonel Assoumani, dis-
solved the country's constitution and disbanded
its institutions. Although a semblance of calm
has returned to the Comoros, the prospects for
future developments are not very good as Colonel
Assoumani has said nothing about handirrg
power back to the civil authoritiess.
30. Another Indian Ocean island, Mauritius,
has lost out in economic terms to Asian competi-
tors. Its government is also under challenge from
an opposition movement but despite these prob-
lems, the country continues to produce good
economic results and its political stability does
not appear to be under threat.
III. The main flashpoints - a short historical
revient and the situation today
(a) Sierra Leone
3 I . The head of state until 199 I was President
Momoh. A series of coups d'6tat then brought
civil war to Sierra Leone and it was at this time
that F. Sankoh founded the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF). Following elections in 1996,
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became President with the
country still in the throes of conflict. In fact the
President is in control of only a quarter of the
country. The RUF, in alliance with a section of
the army under the orders of Commander J.
Koroma, invaded the capital, forcing President
Kabbah to flee. b 1997, Sankoh was taken pris-
oner in Nigeria in circumstances that remain
unclear and ECOMOG forces succeeded in tak-
ing back the capital in February 1998 and rein-
stating President Kabbah. But they did not man-
age to control the country areas where the RUF
is based and in which it recruits its forces.
32. Early in 1999, S. Bockarie, Sankoh's sec-
ond-in-command, launched a counter-offensive
and is currently negotiating a truce in which he
insists that the liberation of his leader is a sine
qua non of a real ceasefire, whereas Nigeria and
President Kabbah categorically reject that condi-
tion. Nigeria accuses Liberia and Burkina Faso
of backing the rebels. [t should also be noted that
Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea (which provide
ECOMOG forces) are lined up against the C6te
d'[voire and Togo which are in favour of a dip-
lomatic solution. But is ECOMOG capable of
-Ho**er, 
E. Soussah, defending counsel for the
Comoros State in the trial of the former mercenary,
Robert Denard, has said that Colonel Assoumani
intends to hold elections "over the next few months".
See Ze Monde,T May 1999.
handling the situation? At best, RUF troops will
return to the countryside, which is where the
movement has its support. Moreover, will Nige-
ia 
- 
a country in transition 
- 
be able to sustain
its involvement? The observer mission the United
Nations deployed in Sierra Leone (IINOMSIL)
has since withdrawn to Conakry. On 18 May
1999, the warring parties signed a ceasefire
which is to last for the duration of the peace talks
that have now begun.
(b) Liberia
33. For eight years (1989-96) Liberia was
devastated by a civil war that started with a re-
volt by the National Patriotic Front for Libera-
tion (NPFL), under the leadership of Charles
Taylor, against the regime of Samuel Doe. ln
1990 an ECOMOG buffer force was deployed
and regained control of the capital and surround-
ing areas. However, the rebel LJLIMO liberation
movement led by A. Kromah kept control of two
areas in the north-west while the NPFL retained
ten areas. President Doe was assassinated. Suc-
cessive ceasefire agreements were concluded in
1991, 1993,1994 and 1995 but never held. A
United Nations Observation Mission in Liberia
(LJNOMIL) was dispatched to the country in
1993. But the number of protagonists increased
(ULIMO led by A. Kromah, ULIMO-J led by
Prince Johnson for the Krahn ethnic group, the
NPFL led by Charles Taylor, and forces loyal to
Samuel Doe). In the end it was Charles Taylor
who emerged victorious and was elected Presi-
dent in July 1997. Horvever, after a period of
relative calm, renewed clashes broke out in Sep-
tember 1998 with President Taylor intent upon
destroying rival factions. The Liberian leader is
also accused by the government of Sierra Leone,
ECOMOG, ttre United States and the United
Kingdom of supporting the rebellion led by the
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone but
he denies this.
(c) Somalia
34. In 1969 a coup d'6tat brought Siad Barre
to power. Civil war raged in Somalia throughout
the 1980s and President Barr6 then had to con-
tend with an uprising by the Somali National
Movement (SNM) and the CSU led by Ali Mahdi
Mohammed who, after successfully driving out
the President and taking the capital in 1991, was
himself proclaimed interim President. But the
Mohammed Aideed, who to intemally
tribe, divided.opposed factions within the
the CSU and led to further c Tribal war
SNM challenged this
demand independence for
leadership of I. Egal), a claim
the international community.
dispute between Ali Mahdi
devastated the country and
spread.
35. In late 1991, the UN
decided to come to the aid of
disarm the militia. It mounted
operations 
- 
LJNSOM I (in 1992
36. In 1997, two agreements
the first at Sodere (Ethiopia)
auspices 
- 
but without Aideed
in Cairo under the aegis of tl
latter agreement made provision
ment of an interim
parliamentary elections and the
independent judiciary. However.
ued mainly between Aideed's
RRA.
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and went on to
(under the
recognised by
Furthermore, a
and
became wide-
Council
population and
two successive
and t"lNSOM tr
troops left So-
having restored
concluded,
Ethiopian
and the second
Egyptians. The
for the appoint-
the holding of
of an
fighting contin-
SNM and the
(in 1993) 
- 
to provide the popu ion with urgent
humanitarian aid but also to and disarm
the militia. But the UN's di attempts
led to clashes, in parti with General
Aideed's militia, and LJNSOM
malia on 3l March 1995 wi
peace.
37. In August 1998, Aideed who has since
died 
- 
and the government in is Ababa man-
lamist rebels in the south). Ethi ia was given a
mandate by the United Nati and the lnter-
Government Authority on (rGAD)
Kenya,
-consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea,
Somalia Sudan and Uganda - lead a peace
initiative. A conference brinsi
aged to overcome some of
(Ethiopia accused Aideed of r
leaders of the various factions
take place in Baidowa in the
address the issue of a federati
the establishment of a central
all the faction leaders.
differences
ine the Is-
together all the
is scheduled to
half of 1999 to
in Somalia and
ity involving
north of the
for 15% and
(d) Sudan
38. The majority of the of Sudan is
Muslim (75Yo concentrated in
country) but Christians
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animists for l0%o live in the south. Sudan has
been an Islamic republic since 1989 and has been
led by Hassan El Tourabi since 1996. Sudan has
a number of rebel movements, the main one be-
ing active in the southern part of the country
which has a Christian majority. A bloody civil
war between Christian and animist forces belong-
ing to the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) led by John Garang and Muslim gov-
emment forces has been raging in Sudan since
1983. But despite a number of attempts to draw
closer together, the various rebel movements
remain divided and no singls sns of them is cap-
able of overthrowing the Islamist government in
Khartoum. In April 1997 a charter for peace was
signed in southem Sudan but a few months later
government forces attacked SPLA positions. The
ceasefire agreed by the two sides in July 1998
was nonetheless renewed for three months on
15 January 1999. Since April 1989 ttre United
Nations has been present in Sudan through Op-
eration Lifeline Sudan, a purely humanitarian
campaign.
(e) Lesotho
39. Since September 1998, the Opposition has
challenged the results of elections that strength-
ened the party in power, the Democratic Con-
gress of Lesotho under the leadership of Prime
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. A section of the
army has gone over to the Opposition and a cli-
mate of insurrection has set in. Invoking the
South African Development Community (SADC)
treaty, government authorities requested South
Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe to intervene to
restore law and order. ln doing precisely that,
South Africa was lambasted by the local popula-
tion and its initiative was given a lukewarm re-
ception by its own citizens. The rebels withdrew
to the mountains and since then, the general
situation regarding law and order has been
fragile.
(l) Congo-Brazzaville
40. From 1979 to 1992 the Congo 
- 
as it was
then known 
- 
was led by the pro-Marxist gov-
ernment of President Daniel Sassou Nguesso. [n
1992, Pase,al Lissouba was elected President by
a sovereign national conference. But a year later
civil war broke out between Lissouba's Zulu and
Cocoye militia, Sassou Nguesso's Cobra soldiers
and the Ninjas led by Bernard Kolelas. In June
1997, Sassou Nguesso launched an all-out attack
wr'th the support of Angola and became self-
appointed President in October. Since then the
fighting has gone on sporadically and flared up
again in December 1998. Nevertheless, a
restructuring agreement was concluded with the
IMF in July 1998 to help Congo-Brazzaville as it
is now known rebuild its economy which has
been badly hit by the conflict (in which some
l0 000 people died over the period June to Octo-
ber 1997 alone). ln addition, the price of oil 
- 
the
country's main source of income 
- 
has become
unstable while Asia, the country's main outlet, is
in the grips of a crisis. The objective of the na-
tional reconciliation programme initiated by
Sassou Nguesso is to restore peace in Congo-
Brazaville.
(g) Angola
41. After gaining independence from Portugal
in 1975, Angola was locked in a civil war be-
tween the People's Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA) loyal to Jos6 Edouardo dos
Santos and initially backed by Cuba and the
former Soviet Union, and Unita 
- 
the rebel
movement led by Jonas Savimbi and supported at
the time by the United States and South Africa.
A peace agreement was concluded at Bicesse
(Estoril) between the warring factions in 1991 as
a result of mediation by Portugal, the United
States and the then Soviet Union. Elections held
the following year were won by the MPLA but
Unita refused to accept the outcome and war
returned to plague the country. In 1993, the UN
Security Council imposed an embargo on oil,
diamonds and arms reaching Unita. The United
Nations spent a year mediating between the par-
ties and deployed troops for the LJNAVEM III
peacekeeping mission and the LJNAOM monitor-
ing mission. ln 1994, the Lusaka peace treaty
was signed. But the United Nations did not man-
age to disarm Unita or establish a dialogue be-
tween the protagonists. As things stand today,
both parties accuse UNAOM of taking sides. The
MPLA appears to take the view that it can get
rid of Savimbi once and for all. Between late
December 1998 and January this year two UN
C-130 aircraft were shot down in a zone
controlled by Unita although it was not possible
to pin the blame on anyone in particular. The
government asked the United Nations to leave the
country and this was also recommended by Sec-
l0
retary-General Kofi Annan in the report he
submiued on 17 January 1999. However, since
the Security Council, and more particularly the
troika made up of the United States, Portugal and
Russia, were not in favour of the United Nations
pulling out altogether, a non-military UN pres-
ence in Angola has been maintained. The parties
to the conflict have so far been all for continuing
what has become a never-ending war and this is
without doubt the main reason why the country,
for all its wealth of natural resources, cannot
marage to feed or educate the population and
still less embark on the work of reconstruction
and economic and social development.
(h) Ethiopia and Eritrea
42. For many years Meles Zenawi and Issaias
Afwerki, the respective Presidents of Eritrea and
Ethiopia, fought together to bring down the
Mengistu dictatorship. Following their victory,
Ethiopia agreed in l99l to Eritrean independ-
ence. But some questions were left open, such as
the borders issue. ln any event the two states
opted for different political and legal economic
systems. In November 1997, Eritrea began
minting its own currency and the conflict of in-
terests became evident. Armed conflict broke out
in May 1998 because of a border dispute over a
few pockets of territory. A truce was declared on
15 June as a result of Italian arbitration but no
solution was found despite further efforts at me-
diation on the part of Eg1pt, Libya, Rwanda,
Sudan the United States and Zimbabwe. The
Organisation of African Unity also failed to per-
suade the parties to compromise. [n January
1999, with the situation on the ground deteriorat-
ing, the United States renewed its mediation ef-
forts through its special envoy to the region,
Anthony Lake, describing his mission as part of
the package of proposals made by the OAU
(withdrawal of Eritrean troops and deployment of
a peacekeeping and monitoring force for six
months). The UN Secretary-General also decided
that same month to dispatch an envoy in an at-
tempt to find a way of averting the war lurking
beneath the surface. Renewed violent clashes in
February and March forced the Eritreans to ac-
cept the principles of the OAU's proposals (the
withdrawal of troops and recognition of intema-
tional boundaries). Further outbreaks of fighting
prompted President Mubarak to embark on a
mediation mission early in May.
(i) Guinea-
43. In June 1998 an ,prising led by
Jodo Bernado
chaos. Senegal
General Mane against
Vieira plunged the country i
and Guinea intervened at the 's request
(on the basis of a 1975 agreement). A
ceasefire was secured in late A through the
mediation of the CPLP ( nity of Portu-
guese-speaking countries) and the Bishop of
Bissau, Monsignor Settimio who has
early insince died. However, hostilities
October. A summit meeting the Economic
Community of West African (ECOWAS),
held on 30-31 October 1998, resulted in the
signrng of an agreement in
ember. It made provision for
rja on I Nov-
foreign troops, the deployment
(the ECOWAS Monitoring G ) buffer force
of I 400 troops provided by the ECOWAS
states, the appointrnent of a of na-
tional union (to be set up jointly by the President
and the rebel junta) and the ing of parlia-
mentary and presidential electi by the end of
1999. The ceasefire which was in August
1998 and the resulting Abuja
November were confirmed in
signed in
under the auspices of A solution
rn which a
arnv
therefore seemed to be taking
goverffnent of national union
theless, elections are still
ember and the National
country through an interim peri culminating in
fresh elections. However, ing broke out
again just as ECOMOG was the point of
being deployed. Following iations in which
Emma Bonino, the EU Commi ioner for hum-
anitarian affairs, acted as broker, the first
stage of ECOMOG's was able to go
ahead 
- 
albeit with some di y 
- 
in February
a rather fragilethis year. For a time it
status quo was holding. A
billeting commission was set
return to peace and the of elections
for November. However, the was bro-
ken yet again on 6 May 1999. clashes
led to a military junta seizi
withdrawal of
an ECOMOG
i in December
steer the
to oversee the
for Nov-
and gov-
and
ernment continue to function.
(j) The Gred Lakes
I. The Democratic Republic of (DRC)
44. The Rwandan crisis and masslve exo-
II
dus of civilians destabilised eastern part of
power. Never-
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the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly
Zure) and the Mobutu regime, Laurent Ddsir6
Kabila, a former rebel proclaimed President in
1997, took advantage of the upheaval in the
country's status quo to march on Kinshasa and
eventually to topple Mobutu and his followers
who were forced into exile. Although Kabila was
supported in his march to victory by Rwanda and
Uganda (and to a lesser extent by Burundi), he
very quickly wanted to break away from them.
However, his decision to send Rwandan troops
back to their country in July 1998 triggered an
uprising by the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis
of Rwandan extraction) supported by Rwanda. In
fact, IGmpala and Kigali saw in Kabila's deci-
sion to break offrelations a loss of their de facto
control over the fertile regron of Kiw, at area"
which, urmong other things, has traditionally been
a breeding ground for Ugandan and Rwanda
anti-government movements.
45. In August a sustained rebellion looked as
though it was threatening the Kinshasa govern-
ment. But just as the situation began to look
bleak for Kabila, Angola, Namibia and, Zm-
babwe carne to his aid by sending their 6lite
troops into Zure and stopping the rebels' ad-
vance. Chad, Libya and Sudan also intervened to
support Kabila while the Central African Repub-
lic tried to bring about conciliation. There was a
series of attempts at mediation over a number of
months on the part of the SADC, the OAU and
the United Nations.
46. Finally, in January 1999 it looked as
though a ceasefire had been agreed at a summit
meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, and a request
was made to the UN Security Council to form a
peacekeeping force. But neither President Kabila
nor the rebel leaders of the Rally for a Demo-
cratic Congo attended the meeting and on 18
January, in an interview with DRC state radio,
President Kabila expressed the view, as the reb-
els were to do later on, that he was not bound by
the agreement reached. Towards the end of April,
he signed a truce with Uganda, which promised
to withdraw its troops from DRC territory. How-
ever, neither Rwanda nor the trvo main rebel
movernents have said they will abide by this
agreement, which was concluded mainly as a
result of Libyan mediatione.
'Serc t" tttorde and Libdration of 2l April 1999.
2. Burundi
47. The civil war in Burundi began rn 1993
following the assassination of the elected Presi-
dent, Mr Ndadaye (a Hutu), during a coup d'etat
carried out by the Tutsi-dominated army. tn
1994, the new President, Mr Ntariamyra (also a
Hutu) was killed together with the Rwandan
President when the aircraft in which they were
travelling was shot down over Kigali in circum-
stances that have never been explained. In 1996,
Major Buyoya (a Tutsi) seized power and has
since had to contend with a rebellion by the Hu-
tus. Former President Nyerere of Tanzania, who
has been a prime mover in mediation efforts, has
drawn up a timetable for negotiations envisaging
an agreement by the end of 1999. In January a
regional summit was held to consider the possible
lifting of sanctions imposed by the countries of
the region in the event of progress in the intra-
Burundi negotiations. A decision was taken to
suspend the sanctions and President Buyoya
undertook to do everything possible to reach a
peace agreement with the armed opposition by
the end of the current yq!r. Some 200 000 people
are said to have died since the beginning of the
civil war.
3. Rwanda
48. The current Tutsidominated government,
which came to power n 1994 following the civil
war and genocide, is tryrng to put down the
(Hutu) rebellion being waged by the former
Rwandan Armed Forces and the lnterhamwe
militia operating in the eastern part of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo. However, these rebel
activities have fallen offsince the start of the war
in the DRC. All tle same, Rwanda is still a
highly unstable country. There has been some
improvement in its economy (in 1998 GDP stood
at 85o/o of the 1994 rate) but defence spending
accounts for 50%o ofthe overall budget. Accord-
ing to various estimates, between 500 000 and a
million people been killed since 1994 in Rwanda
and Kivu, the eastern part of the DRC.
(k) The Central African Republic (CAR)
49. Since 1996, violent rebellions against the
regime led by Ange-Felix Patass6 have divided
the country and weakened its economy. However,
the Bangui Agreements signed in March 1998
put an end to the fighting and led to the holding
of parliamentary elections under the watchful eye
l2
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of MISAB (inter-African mission to monitor the
implementation of the Bangui Agreements), con-
sisting of troops from a number of African
countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali,
Senegal and Togo) with logistic support provided
by France. In April 1998 the mission handed
over to MINURCA (United Nations mission in
the Central African Republic). In the elections
that rvere held in late 1998 the Opposition won
by a narrow majority (55 seats compared w"tth 47
for the government coalition). However, Presi-
dent Patassd's MPLC obtained the support of
two parliamentarians belonging to a small allied
party and of five independent members, bringing
the balance in parliament to 55 seats for the Op-
position as against 54 for the President. But this
balance was upset in a dramatic turn of events
when a member of the LIFAP went over to the
government side in circumstances that were
somewhat unclear.
50. The Opposition, which considers it was
robbed of its majority, is now calling for a pro-
test against the government which also has to
cope with the growing discontent of the popula-
tion due, among other things, to long-standing
arrears in the payment of civil servants' salaries
and concern over the presence oftroops from the
DRC in connection with operations mounted
against the Kiw rebels. Despite MINURCA's
efforts to promote national dialogue, a fresh up-
surge in the fighting cannot, unfortunately, be
ruled out.
IV. The role of the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU and subregional organisations
51. The OAU was founded by the Charter of
25May 1963 which was signed in Addis Ababa
by 32 African states. Today the Organisation has
53 member countries, that is, all the countries of
Africa with the exception of Morocco which
withdrew for a few years as from 1984 in protest
at the admission of the Saharawi Arab Demo-
cratic Republic (Western Sahara). The OAU
takes as its basis the principles of member states'
sovereignty, non-interference in their internal
affairs and respect for their independence and
territorial integrity From the outset it stressed
the importance it attached to the immutability of
borders, a principle it has stoutly defended to this
day in a concem 
- 
not given official expression
but accepted in practice 
- 
not to promote inter-
minable conflicts which would most likely be
provoked by changes to the, often arbitrary, terri-
torial arrangements in Africa that are a legacy of
the colonial period.
52. Holever, it has to be said that since it was
founded some 35 years ago, the OAU has had
difficulty in achieving African unity and, as is
unfortunately the case in other intemational or-
ganisations, it has often found itself unable to do
more than record the differences between its
members. Thus, although the search for peaceful
solutions to crises is one of the Organisation's
declared objectives (as set forth in Articles 3 and
19 of the 1963 Charter), the OAU has in fact
done liule in this ar:ea, at least until recently.
While some of its attempts at mediation have
produced results, its peacekeeping record up to
the beginning of the 1990s was fairly mediocre.
Until then the OAU had neither the appropriate
structures nor resources and, what is more, there
appeared to be no real political will among its
members for it to become the proper forum for
settling conflicts among the African countries
which often preferred to submit their disputes to
bodies outside the continent, such as the Interna-
tional Court of Justicero.
53. [n 1964 an additional protocol to the
Charter made provision for the creation of a
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Ar-
bitration within the OAU. However, for many
years the member states eschewed recourse to
this commission, preferring to set up ad hoc
committees, appoint special mediators or rely on
the Secretary-General of the OAU to intervene to
settle crises. Furthermore, the protocol specified
that "the Commission shall have jurisdiction over
disputes between states only"rr and not therefore
over intemal conflicts.
54. Moreover, for a very long time peace-
keeping in the strict sense was considered the
exclusive prerogative of the United Nations. The
only occasion on which an African peacekeeping
force was deployed was a failure (Chad, l98l).
However, early in the 1990s, the African coun-
tries acknowledged that they needed be become
more involved in the security of their continent.
Thus, in March 1991, a mission consisting of
ft S*t, airprtes mainly concerned borders and the
continental shelf.
rr Article 12 of the 1964 protocol creating the Com-
mission.
l3
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120 observers was dispatched to Rwanda under
the authority of the OAU Secretary-General.
55. But it was not until the Cairo Summit in
1993 that the heads of state and government of
the OAU adopted a declaration establishing a
proper Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Man-
agement and Resolution. The objectives were to
anticipate and prevent conflicts and, where nec-
essary, to restore and consolidate peace. The
Cairo Declaration, paragraph 9 of which stresses
the concems of the states regarding internal
conflicts, also set up a "central body" with a
decision-taking remit. This body is known as the
Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Governmenr. Its members are elected annually in
accordance with the principles of fair regional
representation and rotation. However, the Bureau
is subject to the rule of consensus.
56. In your Rapporteur's opinion, particular
importance should be given to paragraph 130 of
the Cairo Declaration which stipulates that in
cases of blatant violation of law and order, the
OAU not only has a right but also a duty to in-
tervene even before appealing to the international
community for assistance. ln similar cases, refer-
ence may be made to the Organisation's central
body by parties other than the sole parties to the
conflict, and indeed without their consent. Two
years after the Cairo Declaration, the OAU
called upon its member states to develop and
strengthen their peacekeeping capabilities and to
form units of troops specifically designated for
this type of mission. Finally, in 1996 a conflict
management centre was set up at the Organisa-
tion's headquarters consisting, inter alia, of an
early warning section, an operations room and a
logistics centre. Regular meetings of the chiefs-
of-staff were envisaged with a view to defining
an African peacekeeping doctrine and discussing
problems of organisation, command, logistics
and exercise training. A "fund for peace" was
also set up but unfortunately it relies on foreign
aid for most of its funding.
57. Everything would appear to suggest that
some sharing of tasks between the OAU and
subregional African organisations is beginning to
emerge. In practice, the Organisation is concen-
trating mainly on preventive diplomacy (by me-
diating and proposing its good offices) while the
formation of peacekeeping forces and interven-
tion by thern is being left to regional groups of
countries such as the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) or the South
African Development Community (SADC) which
operate under the auspices of the OAU and the
United Nations. Here again, these subregional or-
ganisations seem to find it extremely difficult to
do without foreign aid, as shown by ECOMOG's
repeated calls for assistance to the United
Nations and wealthy non-African countries. The
President of Togo has proposed the creation of
subregional force units which could receive
equipment and financial support from abroad
(the UN, WEU, states with bilateral agreements,
major powers, etc.) while operations proper
should be "wholly funded by the United
Nations".
58. Many African countries are currently
grouping together in this way. As has already
been said, such groups can 
- 
for a number of
reasons 
- 
make a very important contribution to
peacekeeprng. In the first place, they are directly
concerned by the crises affecting their members
or the region whose peace and economic and
social development they are striving to safeguard.
It should also be remembered that their main
objective is development and integration on a
regional level while at the same time they want to
be more involved in settling conflicts.
59. To date, action has been taken by
ECOWAS whose peacekeeping force, ECOMOG,
intervened as early as 1990 first in Liberia and
then in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. The
SADC is also endeavouring to resolve conflicts
mainly through mediation (in the Comoros and
the DRC) but also by sending in troops to restore
peace (Lesotho). Similarly, the East African
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) is making proposals for peaceful solu-
tions to the conflicts affecting its members
(Sudan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia). Last but not
least, there is the Economic Community of Cen-
tral African States, which could turn out to be a
valuable political instrument for security in cen-
tral Africa if the Libreville Summit in April 1998
is anything to go by.
V The peacekeeping requirements of the
OAU, subregional organisotions and
ad hoc coalitions of certain states
60. There is certainly a case for being critical
about the effectiveness of the OAU in the field of
t4
DOCUMENT 1648
African peacekeeping. Yet it also has to be said
that the United Nations itself is no more effec-
tive, except when the major powers decide other-
wiser'. At the Lisbon Colloquy the Assembly of
WEU held on 15 September 1998, Ambassador
Ant6nio, Deputy Secretary-General of the Org-
anisation of African Urrity, and Mr Pere, Presi-
dent of the Togolese National Assembly, left no-
one in doubt as to the Africans' resolve to take
the security of their continent into their own
hands. But both stressed that considerable sup-
port from other countries was also necessary for
the success of peacekeeping operationsl3. Fur-
thermore, the director of the OAU's office in
Brussels, with whom your Rapporteur talked at
length when preparing this report, stressed the
possibilities for developing the existing machin-
ery, while confirming the political will of Afri-
cans to become even more active in the field of
peacekeeping.
61. It is quite clear that the main requirements
of African peacekeeping forces are of a logistic
and financial order. The lack of sufficiently well
trained troops for peacekeeping missions is also a
major problem, though secondary compared with
the need for better transport, telecommunications,
information and troop commands. In addition, the
cost ofsuch operations is in itselfa heavy burden
to bear for African countries whose resources are
clearly very limited. By way of example, the cost
to Nigeria, whose troops form the bulk of the
ECOMOG force, of the intervention in Sierra
Leone can be estimated at about US$ I millionra.
It would consequently seem that foreign support
for the African states is more crucial today than
ever before given that the OAU does not have the
necessary funds, since arrears of contributions
and their irregular payment by the member states
prevents the Organisation from fulfilling the role
of an African-style UN.
62. In all these cases the problems are almost
always the same. Political will and the practical
means to take action are often lacking while for-
eign support, at least in terms of logistics and
funding, would appear essential if only in the
r-' S". A. Bourgi, voyage au coeur de l'oUA in
Politique dtrangdre 1998, Vol. 4.
r3 See the offrcial record ofthe colloquy.
ra See Anthony Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, quoted in Jeune
Afrique.
medium term. Some peacekeeping missions can
in fact be handled by all-African contingents with
the support, in logistic and other areas, of a non-
African country. An example of this is the inter-
African mission to monitor the implementation of
the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), which ended
in April 1998 and rvas replaced by MINURCA,
ur which the troops involved were all-African
with France providing logistic support. It would
be very difficult for such operations, undertaken
by coalitions of the willing or organised at a
genuinely subregional level, to do without foreign
support when it comes to arms and a number of
areas in rvhich logistic support is vital.
W. The United Nations
and peacekeeping in Africa
63. By virtue of its status and history, the
United Nations should be considered as the guar-
antor par excellence of the maintenance of peace
in Africa as in the rest of the world. It was upon
the United Nations, or to be more precise, the
Security Council that its founders conferred
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security" (Article 24 of
the UN Charter). There is no doubt that since it
was established, the UN has been of crucial im-
portance for the African continent. It firmly sup-
ported the process of decolonisation in the 1960s
and 1970s's. and also provided a forum in which
the African countries could make their voices
heard in the concert of nations, initially through
their representation in the General Assembly and
subsequently in the Security Council as elected
members. Finally, the UN has played a vital role
for many years in providing development and
humanitarian aid via its specialised agencies
(I.INDP, UNICEF, HCR)
64. With specific reference to peacekeeping,
the United Nations was the main coordinator of
the operations that proved necessary as from the
early 1960s and demonstrated its resolve in this
respect by creating the United Nations Operation
in the Congo (UNOC), under Resolution 169 of
24 lanuary 1961, in order to tackle the Congo-
lese conflict. However, the cold war prevented
the United Nations from carrying out its role to
the full, both in Africa and elsewhere. It was not
13 S-.. UN General Assembly Resolution Acllsl4l
XV of 14 December 1960 and its Declaration of
24 October 1970.
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until 1989 that the UN was able to become more
active in the field of peacekeeping by sending
missions to Namibia (United Nations Transition
Assistance Group LJNTAG) and Angola
(United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
-
LINAVEM). As Mr Miyet, United Nations Under
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,
reminded participants at the Lisbon Colloquy in
September 1998, of the 32 peacekeeping opera-
tions the United Nations carried out throughout
the world between 1989 and 1998, 16 were on
the continent of Africa.
65. However, the international community was
so shocked by the failure of the UN missions in
Somalia (IJNSOM I and II) that it subsequently
showed great reluctance, and even refused, to
become involved in African affairs. UNSOM,
which was deployed in Somalia from 1992, was
the first UN operation that did not go through to
the end of its mandate. In taking its decision to
terminate the operationr6, the LJN Security
Council noted that fighturg and clashes between
some factions and UN forces were continuing,
thus admitting that its peacekeeping forces had
virtually become a party to the conflict. Although
the mission was a success in humanitarian terms,
it failed in its crucial task of disarming the war-
ring parties, namely, the clans.
66. Since that unnerving experience, the Se-
curity Council appears to have reacted very cau-
tiously to African crises and in some cases has
avoided taking the requisite decisions. It can thus
be said to have stopped intervening actively in
certain situations 
- 
with terrible consequences in
the case of the Rwandan tragedy. Although the
part some countries played in the crisis is ex-
tremely controversial, it does nothing to alter the
fact that the United Nations, though sufficiently
well informed, showed itself to be incapable of
preventing the tragedy from unfolding. In point
of fact, once the genocide was under way, and
despite the alarming information and repeated
warnings from the head of the UN observer mis-
sion to Angola (I.JNAOM), the Security Council
did not take the necessary decisions or deploy the
means that would have enabled the appropriate
troops to have been sent to the scene to stop the
massacres. Quite to the contrary, the Security
Council decided, in response to the Secretary-
rUN Sec*ity Council Resolution 954 of 4 Nov-
ember 1994.
General's recommendations, to reduce the size of
its mission. Coming after Somalia, the Rwandan
experience merely added to the United Nations'
feeling of unease and reluctance to become in-
volved in African crises, with the result that it
lost a great deal of credibilrty in the eyes of the
countries of that continent.
67. The fact ttrat UNAOM's effectiveness was
called into question and that both the Angolan
authorities and even the Unita rebels wanted the
mission to leave the country were proof of the
United Nations' loss of influence in Africa, un-
deniably a potentially dangerous development. In
an attempt to rectifu this state of affairs, the
United Nations has for some time been trying to
promote the idea of African peacekeeping opera-
tions being led by the OAU, subregional organi-
sations (such as ECOWAS, the SADC or IGAD)
or by groups of states belonging to the region
affected by a particular crisis (for instance,
MISAB in the Central African Republic). This
new policy was first outlined by Mr Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace, before
being developed in his report to the Security
Council of I November 1995. The proposals in it
were taken up by his successor, Mr Kofi
Annanl'.
68. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter makes
provision (in Articles 52 to 54) for peacekeeping
operations to be dealt with by regional agencies
provided they are consistent with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations. It is also
clear that the UN does not have the human and
financial resources for managing all the crises
that erupt on the African continent. Moreover,
the particularity of such crises, which for the
most part involve conflicts between states with
grievances against each other, often calls for
regional action to be taken by the forces of
countries with a beffer knowledge of the causes,
determining factors, terrain and general political
context. However, in his report referred to above,
Mr Annan is certainly not against the United
Nations continuing to intervene directly in Af-
fr ff,. *rses of conflict and the promotron of dur-
able peace and zustainable development in Africa",
the Secretary-General's report to the Security Coun-
cil of 16 April 1998, which the Council endorsed in
Resolution 1170 of 28 May 1998.
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ncar8. The UN is currently directly involved in
three African crises: in Sierra Leone (with
LJNOMSIL), the Central African Republic (with
MINURCA) and Angola (with LINAOM).
69. Your Rapporteur's general conclusion is
that, without actually divesting itself of its
overall responsibility, the United Nations would
like the African countries to be more involved in
peacekeeping and security on their continent. It
should therefore, at least according to its Secre-
tary-General, support regional and subregional
initiatives to promote peace, while encouraging
the enhancement of African peacekeeping capa-
bilities. The United Nations has accordingly de-
cided to strengthen cooperation with regional
organisations by taking a series of steps includ-
ing the creation of a special trust fund for con-
flict prevention in Africa, the setting-up of a
liaison office at the seat of the OAU, annual
meetings of representatives of the UN and OAU
Secretariats-General and establishing closer rela-
tions with ECOWAS, the IGAD and the SADC.
The UN's declared aim is to coordinate initia-
tives to promote peace while ensuring there are
not too many of them and that they do not con-
tradict each other. [n addition, on the military
side the UN has set up training prograrnmes
(training assistance teams, train the trainers) and
provided support for a number of exercises.
Furthermore, its missions, such as UNOMSIL in
Sierra Leone and UNOMIL in Liberia (where the
main operation was led by ECOMOG) have been
organised as a backup or complement to action
taken by regional forces.
70. Finally, the United Nations would like to
coordinate the various initiatives being taken
outside Africa, such as the United States ACRI
programme, the French RECAMP project and
aid programmes being implemented by the United
Kingdom or Portugal. As Mr Miyet pointed out
at the Lisbon Colloquy, all this calls first and
foremost for "a genuine readiness to share infor-
mation and expertise" as well as "ongoing politi-
cal support from member states" and "adequate
financial resources". It is also worth noting that,
in his address, Mr Miyet stressed that WEU
-t 
nc*rding to paragraph 44 of Mr Annan's report
to the Security Council, "Regional organisations can
face political, structutal, financial or planning limit-
ations. At times the impartiality or neutrality of their
member states may be questioned ...".
could provide the United Nations with very valu-
able support for the efforts it was making.
WL Action tahen by the lilest
(a) Europe
71. A number of WEU member countries have
a long association with Africa. The paragraphs
that follow outline some of the national pro-
gftrrnmes providing aid to African countries. It is
a matter for regret that most of them are carried
out on a bilateral basis.
72. France has traditionally maintained a
strong presence in Africa where it wielded con-
siderable influence throughout the post-colonial
period. However, its experience in Rwanda
seems to have had the same effect on the French
authorities as Somalia had on the United States
in that, since 1995, France has been increasingly
less inclined to become involved in peacekeeping
operations in Africa on its own, preferring in-
stead to be part of a multinational endeavour. At
the same time it appears to want to readjust its
relations with Africa by breaking away from the
mould of its special influence over the African
French-speaking countries and moving towards a
policy of aid for all African states regardless of
whether they are French-, Portuguese- or Eng-
lish-speaking. This fundamental shift has gone
hand in hand with a reduction in the number of
French troops pre-positioned in Africa. By 2000
France will have reduced a total of 8 400 troops
stationed at six bases in 1998 to 5 500 spread
over five bases.
73. To offset or complement this measure,
France has implemented a concept known as
RECAMP 
- 
standing for the reinforcement of
African peacekeeping capabilities. As Admiral
Borgis stressed at the Lisbon Colloquy,
RECAMP is based on three pillars: training,
equipment and exercises and field training to
enable African troops to carry out peacekeeping
operations. The first practical examples of how
this concept is being applied can be seen in the
Central African Republic with MISAB (now
replaced by MINURCA) and in the logistics and
transport facilities supplied to ECOMOG in
Guinea-Bissau. Similarly to the American ACRI
programme, the RECAMP concept operates in a
UN framework and is open to any African coun-
tries wishing to take part in it. It main purpose is
to form and train national units which can be
t7
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mobilised at speed for peacekeeping operations
authorised by the United Nations. Under the
French project 
- 
and this is ferhaps its most
positive feature 
- 
logistics can be made available
by establishing pre-positioned equipment depots
such as the one in Dakar. It is planned to set up a
training centre at Zanbankro, C6te d'Ivoire, in
the near future. The RECAMP concept gave nse
to the first large-scale African exercise, involving
3 500 troops from eight countries (Cape Verde,
the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bisau,
Mali, Mauritania and Senegal). Dubbed "Guidi-
makha 98", this exercise was also supported by
the United Kingdom and the United States and
was monitored by observers from WEU
74. The Francophone movement emerged in
the 1960s as a result of France's desire to bring
together its former colonies in a community in
which the French language was the common
denominator 
- 
hence the involvement also of
Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg and Slvitzerland.
At the same time the movement reflects a resolve
to promote the French language and culture as a
counterbalance to the influence of Anglo-Ameri-
can culture. The Agency for Cultural and Tech-
nical Cooperation (ACCT) was established in
1970 and became the Francophone Agency in
1996. Mainly funded by France, the activities of
this intergovernmental agency were for a time
limited to education and training programmes. It
was principally during the 1980s under the Mit-
terrand Presidency that the Francophone move-
ment was given a new lease of life, with the first
summit of French-speaking countries being held
in 1986 along the lines of Franco-African summit
meetings. Since then, conferences of the heads of
state and government have been held every two
years. Over the years France has given the
movement a more political slant: one only has to
think back to Frangois Mitterrand's Chaillot
speech in 1991, in which he urged Africa to go
down the path of democracy, or the refusal to
hold the 1993 Francophone summit in Zaire as a
sign of protest against the blocking of the process
of transition to democracy. Today, the Fran-
cophone movement is making quite considerable
headway in its relations with African countriesre
tr Of itr SZ member states, 28 are African countries:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Congo-Brazzanille, C6te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic
through various aid and cooperation pro-
grammes. In addition to its summits, it has a
Permanent Council (15 members representing the
heads of state and government) and a Secretariat-
General, wtuch was created n 1997 with Mr
Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed as its head. In
the same way as in the Commonwealth, security
and defence issues are addressed more in a bilat-
eral framework berween France and the other
mernber countries. Thus the Francophone move-
ment is neither a military alliance nor a defence
organisation. Similarly, although its members are
very active in the field of peacekeeping, the
movement does not participate as such in peace-
keeping operations. Despite the shift of emphasis
in the 1980s, the Francophone movement's
activities have for the most part remained cultu-
ral. Nevertheless, they now also extend to eco-
nomic aspects, as shown by the Monaco Con-
ference on 14-15 April 1999 which was attended
by the finance ministers of the member states.
The declared aim of the Secretary-General is for
the movement to become an international organi-
sation in the true sense, able to make its voice
heard in the major intemational institutions such
as the IMF or WTO.
75. ln 1994, the then Prime Minister, John
Major, confirmed the United Kngdom 's support
for African peacekeeping initiatives by proposing
assistance with the formation, equipment and
training of African units. This offer has been
maintained by the present British Government. In
the meantime, the UK aid programme has been
put into effect through bilateral partnerships, in
particular with Ghana (training courses for Gha-
naian officers) and Zimbabwe (training course
held at the military academy in Harare). In Octo-
ber 1994, the Blue Caucus exercise was held at a
British military academy near London for offi-
cers from Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana and Eg1pt.
The United Kingdom is also providing logistic
and financial aid to the ECOMOG force in Sierra
Leone.
76. The Commonwealth has an important part
to play in Africa since no fewer than 19 African
of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, Tunisia.
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countries2o (out of a total of 54) are members. Its
activities cover a range of areas: the economy
and trade, ecology, education and training,
health, democracy and human rights, and secu-
rity and defence 
- 
although the Commonwealth is
neither a military alliance nor a defence organi-
sation. Defence cooperation and arrangements
for strengthening African peacekeeping forces
are organised on a wholly bilateral basis between
the United Kingdom and other member countries
or else between the United Kingdom and the
OAU. In contrast, the Commonwealth is much
more active in the civil and political spheres and
since 1965 has had a Secretariat-General which
manages three special funds: Technical Coop-
eration, the Youth Programme and the Science
Council. The United Kingdom contributes 30%
to the Commonwealth budget with the remaining
contnbutions being paid by each member country
on a pro rata basis according to its means. Since
the early 1990s, the Commonwealth has stepped
up its activities to further peace, democracy and
human rights. Betrveen 1990 and 1997 for in-
stance, it supervised some 20 or so elections and
referendums. Similarly, recourse has been had on
several occasions to the Secretary-General's
good offices in the settlement of crises (such as in
Tat:zalrra and Zarnbia). In addition to its strong
opposition to the apartheid system in South Af-
rica until 1994, the Commonwealth has often
exerted pressure on a number of its members in
order to restore peace or safeguard democracy.
In 1995, for example, it decided to ban Nigeria
from membership following the execution of Ken
Saro-Wisa, who opposed the regime. It marginal-
ised the Gambia after the 1994 coup d'6tat and
took action against Sierra Leone following the
coup d'6tat by Commander Koroma n 1997.
From an institutional point of view it is interest-
ing to note the decision taken in 1995 at the
Auckland Summit in New Zealand, whereby the
Commonwealth created the Ministerial Action
Group for the purpose of fighting serious and
repeated human rights violations.
77. Portugal, which has had a presence in
Africa for centuries, is today again involved in a
-Bot*rnu, 
cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tarzania, Uganda, Zanbia and Zim-
babwe.
wide spectrum of activities ranging from educa-
tion and culture to the economy, and initiatives to
promote development, health and management
training through to the setting-up of a democratic
system of public administration. The WEU As-
sembly's Lisbon Colloquy and Portugal's prepa-
rations to host a Euro-African summit, also in
Lisbon, in 2000 amply demonstrate its active
involvement. In the context of the bilateral coop-
eration it has developed with each of the five
Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal
has supported a change in legislation on defence,
particularly as regards the structures and opera-
tion of the armed forces, with a view to makrng
flrem more democratic and strengthening their
links with the political institutions. It has devel-
oped a number of programmes for the reorgaru-
sation of the defence and armed forces ministries
and the training of senior officers, mainly in
military colleges catering for higher education.
Another significant item is the programme to
help reorganise those services and units which
will soon be capable of participating in peacetime
missions in the public interest (inter alia con-
struction work, communications), thereby en-
hancing the social development and professional
qualifi cations of conscripts.
78. After several years of sections of the mili-
tary personnel of the five countries concerned
having been trained either in Portugal or at their
own training centres, all the parties have arrived
at a certain convergence of doctrines and have
developed common concepts, making for better
all-round military cooperation :rmong them. The
result is that the five countries are now far better
equipped to take part in peace mrssions on the
African continent under the auspices of the
United Nations or the subregional organisations
in which each of them is involved, again in ac-
cordance with a LN mandate. This situation may
help to strengthen African conflict-prevention
and peacekeeping capabilities as a whole. Fi-
nally, the participation of military observers and
small contingents from the five Portuguese-
speaking countries in combined exercises in
Portugal is a fact also worth noting as is Portu-
guese logistic support for exercises carried out
under the aegis of the SADC, involving forces
from Angola and Mozambique.
79. The setting-up of a network of multilateral
relations across the community of Portuguese-
speaking countries brings another dimension to
l9
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relations between Africa and Portugal. Indeed,
the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-speaking
countries), which was established in 19962' and
comprises five African countries (Angola, Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and S5o
Tomd e Principe), works in fields such as educa-
tion, culture and training, particularly of mana-
gerial staff. [t is a new international organisation
which has quickly acquired a political dimension.
To its credit, the CPLP has already taken a num-
ber of diplomatic and political initiatives to re-
store peace, such as those which led to the cessa-
tion of hostilities in Guinea Bissau.
80. Belgium has also been engaged in Africa
for a long time but in recent years has become
increasingly cautious 
- 
aga;n as a result of the
Rwandan crisis 
- 
and now prefers to take part in
programmes and operations conducted under
United Nations auspices. Since 1994, Belgium
has contributed with funds and assistance to
various UN initiatives such as the TJNAMIR II
(Rwanda) and OMIB (Burundi) African peace-
keeping operations. On the diplomatic front, it
has also supported the OAU's mediation efforts
in Burundi led by J. Nyerere, contributed to the
OAU peace fund and put up funding for Burkina
Fasso's participation in ECOMOG operations in
Liberia. It has helped the IGAD with its project
aimed at settling the Sudanese conflict.
81. Italy is another country whose traditional
involvement in Africa transcends its colonial past
and today it too is active in a number of areas. In
referring to his country's policy on Africa at the
Lisbon Colloquy, Ambassador Melani stressed
that Italy was putting the focus on training in its
African progruunme. lndeed, in addition to its
contribution to OAU activities, Italy has set up a
cooperation programme with Ethiopia. It is pro-
viding funds for African officers to attend
courses at police-training centres and also for
peacekeeping seminars given at the United Na-
tions StaffCollege in Turin22.
82. Finally, Denmark's cooperation pro-
$:unme (via its special fund for peace in Africa)
and in particular the action it has taken to set up
' 
ft. *uy in which this community is organised is
very similar to the precedents set by the Common-
wealth and the Francophone movement.
22 See the official record of the Lisbon Colloquy.
a peacekeeping training centre in Zimbabwe are
worthy of mention.
83. This list is by no means exhaustive. Gen-
erally speaking, the European countries are very
much involved in Africa and their efforts clearly
go further than peacekeeping alone. Many Euro-
pean nations provide Africa with development
aid and economic cooperation which is particu-
larly valuable given that crises will not disappear
for as long as Africa does not make any headway
in achieving social and economic development
and sustained political stability. However, all
these European initiatives unfortunately have
only limited effect partly because there are too
many of them and partly because of the risk of
overlap and contradiction between them. Your
Rapporteur considers it worth paylng heed to a
comment by the Sengalese army spokesman after
a training session organised in 1997 by US spe-
cial forces when he said that Senegalese troops
"had learnt nothing the French had not already
taught them"23. This was perhaps one of the rea-
sons that led to the conclusion of the tripartite
initiative coordination agreement between the
United States, France and the United Kingdom in
1997. A further development is Anglo-French
rapprochement on Africa as illustrated by the
meetings Mr Robin Cook and Mr Hubert Vddrine
had in Ghana and COte d'Ivoire in March 1999.
The clear objective of those meetings was to put
an end to the rivalry between France and the
United Kingdom on the African continent. The
two governments intend to cooperate closely to
the point of having joint diplomatic missions and
taking action together to promote human rights
and economic development2a. This is to be wel-
comed as it can only have positive effects for the
continent as a whole.
84. To avoid contradiction and duplication in
European initiatives, WEU could quite clearly
take on the job of liaising between the various
actions of its member countries designed to
strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities.
Moreover, as it is plain that most WEU member
countries no longer wish to intervene in Africa in
an individual capacity, WEU could provide them
TTh" E"onomist, "An African answer to African
wars", 18 October 1997.
2o See Le Figaro, "Entente cordiale en Afrique", l0
March 1999 and the Financial Times, "UK, France
push for Africa fair deal", 12March 1999.
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with a framework for various forms of participa-
tion or at least for their contributions to the
peacekeeping operations which unfortunately
continue to be necessary in Africa.
O) The United States
85. History shows that compared with its in-
volvement in other parts of the world, the United
States appears to take only limited interest in
Africa. To begin with, it has never been a colo-
nial power 
- 
at least not on that continent. Dur-
ing the cold war it prefened to leave the main
responsibility for defining Western interests to
the Europeans and chose to focus its own efforts
on areas it considered were strategically impor-
tant. [t is wort]r nothing that no President of the
United States went to Africa between Mr
Carter's visit in 1978 and Mr Clinton's in 1998.
This absence, which was also symbolic, naturally
had a corollary and one of the events that marred
President Clinton's first term in office was the
failure of US intervention in Somalia. It was
virtually the only initiative he took on Africa
during his first four years in power.
86. However, the American administration
was aware of a vacuum and in 1995 decided to
do something about it. This is the context in
which the President's tour of Africa in March/
April 1998 is to be seen. The idea of a "new
partnership" between the United States and
Africa gained currency, its aim being mainly to
secure a more sustained trade and funding com-
mitrnent. At the same time, the United States
wanted to promote efforts to bring about political
stability in Africa. Washington accordingly de-
cided to support a "new generation" of leaders
who would open up the possibility of an "African
renaissance" covering an area stretching from
Uganda to South Africa. However, because the
Americans were disappointed by their failure in
Somalia, they no longer wished to become di-
rectly involved in crises even though they realised
that their investnent growth depended on politi-
cal and economic stabilisation of the region.
87. It was precisely to meet ttris concern that
in 1996 the State Deparfrnent came up with the
idea of the ACRI (African Crisis Response lni-
tiative) which was intended to support and
strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities.
The main points of the programme, a typical way
of demonstrating renewed American interest,
were clearly described by Ambassador McCallie,
ACRI Coordinator at the US State Deparunent,
at the Lisbon Colloquy. In keeping with the pro-
posals submitted by the UN Secretary-General in
his 1995 report, the ACRI proposes a pro-
grarnme for training African toop contingents
for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid opera-
tions. It also makes provision for supplying ap-
propriate equipment to meet the contingents'
needs (telecommunications in particular). A
number of African countries (Senegal, Uganda,
Malawi, Mali and Ghana) have already benefited
from the progranrme.
88. The Americans stress that the ACRI is not
intended to undermine European influence on the
African continent, despite the widely held view to
the contrary. Furthermore, it seems that this con-
cern not to make Africa the butt of rivalry be-
tween Europeans and Americans led to the sign-
ing of an agreement between the United States,
France and the United Kingdom in New York in
May 1997 . This important document, dubbed the
tripartite initiative, makes provision for coordi-
nation between three of the main Western coun-
tries with a view to helping the Africans develop
their peacekeeping capabilities.
WII. Action taken by religious associations
and non-gwernmental organisations (NG Os)
(a) Religio u s as so ci ation s
89. Throughout history, religious associations
have had a strong presence in Africa. Their ac-
tivities are often vital to African populations and
they provide a great deal of aid in regions which
are sometimes ignored by the media and where
the international community is under-represented.
Among other things, the missions run by these
associations provide shelter and first aid as well
as distributing food and medicines to people dis-
placed by conflicts. For example, in Sierra Leone
today, religious orders continue to support the
civilian population whereas the NGOs and UN
agencies involved in humanitarian relief opera-
tions have left the country. [t sometimes happens
that members of religious associations are taken
hostage or even killed. Among the activities
worthy of mention are those of the orders of the
Saverians, Mother Theresa, Saint Joseph and the
missionaries of the MISNA, whose press agency
is often the last source of information present in
crisis areas. While the Roman Catholic Church
has long been actively involved in Africa, it is
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important not to forget the other faiths and their
associations which are also extremely active,
particularly the various branches of the Re-
formed Church which have played a not incon-
siderable part in opposing regimes that practise
racial segregation.
90. Although evangelism and humanitarian aid
are their main priorities, the various Churches
and religious associations do not confine their
activities to these areas alone. They occasionally
act as mediators, bringing to bear their good
offices in a number of crises thanks to the influ-
ence they wield over African peoples and their
leaders. The results of this type of mediation can
be seen in countries such as Benin, Congo-Braz-
zaville, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and the Central
African Republic. A recent example of this type
of mediation is the work the Sant' Egidio Com-
munity is doing in the Democratic Republic of
Congo in an effort to establish a dialogue be-
tween the rebels and President Kabila. The Com-
munity was also directly involved in restoring
peace between the Frelimo government and Ren-
mo in Mozambique. Because of their impartiality
and the moral values they defend, religious
associations can play a significant role in the
process of restoring peace and bringing about
reconciliation.
@) Aher types of NGO
91. Mention must also be made of the work
done by humanitarian relief agencies which, per-
haps in Africa more than anyrrhere else, often
have a crucial part to play. Their activities range
widely from the supply of emergency aid to edu-
cation progr:mlmes. These NGOs often provide
first aid or initial food supplies and are exten-
sively involved in the publicity campaigns which
now appear to be essential for all international
action of any scope. However, it has to be
stressed that their activities entail a long-term
commiunent. Emergency aid should not be al-
lowed to eclipse all the work NGOs do behind
the scenes over a long period in order to try and
rebuild civil societies and promote sustainable
development in African countries. Moreover,
there is no doubt that these organisations are
becoming increasingly important in international
relations and are winning more and more recog-
nition from international institutions. The United
Nations, for instance, has conferred an advisory
status on some NGOs. The World Bank fre-
quently has recourse to their services for devel-
opment missions and their activities are increas-
ingly being co-financed by international bodies
(such as AID or the LNPD). Relief agencies are
extremely effective because they provide more
flexibility for action and have a detailed know-
ledge of the local situation. Staff doing humani-
tarian relief work in crisis areas therefore provide
a link with the intemational community and are
an important source of information. The present
crisis in Kosovo illustrates, as if proof were nec-
essary, the role NGOs can play in brurging emer-
gency relief to refugees. Whereas it is the states
which take charge of the military aspect of inter-
national actions, more often than not it is the
NGOs that provide most of the humanitarian aid.
As a result of their expertise and independence,
these organisations have therefore become vir-
tually indispensable for the success of peace-
keeping and security initiatives.
IX. The role of WEU
92. Since the 1992 Petersberg Declaration,
issues of peacekeeping have officially become a
major, if not the main, concern of WEU. There is
no doubt that problems of this type are of par-
ticular relevance in Africa, whose geographic
proximity and economic, cultural and historical
ties with Europe are undeniable. It was therefore
impossible for WEU to ignore them and, indeed,
no overall analysis of European security can fail
to take Africa into account. Thus, at a WEU
Council meeting in Lisbon in 1995, Ministers
considered African problems and made a point of
setting down the action that could be taken "to
support Africans' own efforts, including through
regional and subregional institutions and struc-
tures, to promote the preservation of peace, the
search for reconciliation and the achievement of
sustainable and socially balanced development
through good govern ance"2s .
93. Today, this continues to be the line WEU
is endeavouring to follow since it considers that it
is up to the Africans themselves to ensure peace
and stability on their continent. However, despite
the obvious logic of tlus strategy, your Rap-
porteur takes the view that Europe cannot do
without an overall policy on Africa, formulated
at a high political level in an all-European
framework. It is clear that no peacekeeping ini-
R See section II.5 of lhe Common reflection on the
new European security conditions.
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tiative can be effective unless it is backed up by a
proper policy and action to help maintain law
and order, promote economic and social devel-
opment and so on. Conversely, as events in re-
cent years have shown, development aid can have
only limited effect if it is not accompanied by
measures designed to stabilise Africa's political
and security landscape. It is also important to
bear in mind that Europe's Africa policy is
bound to have enormous humanitarian conse-
quences.
94. Let us not forget that it was the Great
Lakes crisis, and in particular the terrible civil
war in Rwanda, that pushed the Council into
giving thought to the matter for the first time in
June 1994. WEU offered member states its sup-
port on that occasion by proposing that the
Planning Cell act as the coordrnation point for
their contributions. The Satellite Centre for its
part responded to a number of task requests con-
cerning the region, as the Centre's Deputy Direc-
tor, Mr Asbeck, informed participants at the
Lisbon Colloquy. This action by WEU was sup-
ported by the Council of the European Union
which in November 1995 requested WEU to
elaborate and implement specific actions that
could contribute to the mobilisation of African
peacekeeping capabilities and also reserved the
possibility of requesting WEU to contribute to
the implementation of any action taken by the
EU. A few days later, the WEU Council, meeting
in Madrid, "studied" the possibility of supporting
African peacekeeping initiatives. As everyone
knows, Europe's response to the Great Lakes
crisis fell a long way short of what was required
under the circumstances. However, the need for
joint action was clearly felt and could have led to
a constructive debate.
95. In summer 1996, officials from the WEU
Secretariat-General and Planning Cell went on a
fact-finding visit to the OAU and various African
countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Tanza-
nia) to establish exactly what African peace-
keeping requirements entailed. The visit led to the
submission of a number of proposals on two
options: action that WEU could take on its own
and action it might be asked to take in support of
EU initiatives.
96. The report, appended to the Ostend Decla-
ration of 19 November 1996, proposed establish-
rng contacts with the OAU and African subre-
gional organisations (such as ECOWAS, the
SADC and IGAD) for the purpose of reflecting
on how to support African peacekeeping initia-
tives (with communications, logistics and train-
rng) and giving WEU the role of coordinating
national contributions from European countries.
It also advocated strengthening cooperation with
and supporting action taken by the European
Union.
97. Furthermore, the deterioration in the Great
Lakes crises prompted the WEU ministers to task
the Permanent Council to establish what contri-
bution the Organisation could make to settling it.
This desire for action was encouraged by the
Council of the European Union which, on
22 November 1996, requested WEU, on the basis
of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union,
'to examine as a matter of urgency how it can,
for its part, contribute to the optimum use of the
operational resources available". We now know
that this action was limited to finding out what
offers of assistance the member states could
make and compiling the information in a data-
base. The consensus necessary for carrying out a
joint European mission was not forthcoming.
While Europe was clearly not prepared to use all
its resources, WEU nevertheless continued to
support African peacekeeping missions and sent
observers to the Nangbeto 97 and Guidimakha
98 exercises which were part of the tripartite
initiative (France, the United Kingdom and the
United States) to strengthen African peacekeep-
ing capabilities. As the WEU Secretary-General
was the first to admit, in his address to the Lis-
bon Colloquy, WEU's record is one of mixed
achievement. But without the political will of its
member countries, the Organisation can do little.
98. It is common knowledge that there is some
reluctance among those countries to use WEU
either as a point of coordination or for other ini-
tiatives. ln December 1997, WEU was repre-
sented at a meeting held by the UN Department
for Peacekeeping. Following the meeting a ques-
tionnaire was sent out for the purpose of identifr-
ing and collating existing offers of aid so as to
avoid duplication and make good any shortcom-
ings. In February 1998 member states were in-
vited to supply the Planning Cell with copies of
the UN questionnaire'u. It is disappointing that,
-R.pon 
by the Politico-Military Group approved by
the WEU Council on 26 February 1998.
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according to information given to your Rap-
porteur, the Cell has received only five replies to
date (from France, Germany, Italy, Norway and
the United Kingdom). It should also be said that
it has at times been difficult to take action in
supp.ort of EU initiatives because the machinery
for cooperation between the EU and WEU was
totally or partially ineffective and this may still
be the case today.
99. However there is no denying 
- 
as the
WEU Secretary{eneral pointed out at the collo-
quy 
- 
that the Great Lakes crisis in 1996 did at
least reveal the limits of the existing arrange-
ments and enabled WEU to improve them, in
particular by drawrng up more effective proce-
dures to respond to future requests to WEU from
the EU in pursuance of the Treaty on European
Union. ln 1996, the Council of Ministers, meet-
ing in Ostend, said WEU was ready to respond to
requests from the EU whenever recourse to mili-
tary means appeared necessary. At their meeting
in Rhodes in March 1998, the Ministers recalled
their desire for enhanced cooperation with the
European Union and tasked the Council to ex-
plore further possibilities to promote WEU's
contribution to peacekeeping in Africa
(paragraph 52 of the Rhodes Declaration). It is
however to be regretted that the Rome Declara-
tion does not mention African problems.
100. What conclusions can be drawn? For al-
most five years now, our Organisation has been
looking into the issues surrounding peacekeeping
in Africa and has a good idea of African re-
quirements in this field: information, communi-
cations, logistics, transport and training including
the organisation of joint exercises. For all their
resolve to take responsibility for their security,
there is no denying that the African countries still
need help. Indeed, it is perhaps today that they
have the greatest need of support from Europe.
We believe that WEU can meet that need to a
large degree and not just by rationalising and
coordinating offers from its member countries. It
is imperative for far more use to be made of the
Torrej6n Satellite Centre, whose assistance is
requested by our African partners.
101. Mine-clearing is another important area
and one in which WEU has already accumulated
valuable experience. Your Rapporteur considers
it important to stress the role the Organisation
could play in this field as there can be no return
to security and stability for the vast majority of
countries emerging from a crisis without mine-
clearing operations. Mines continue to maim and
kill even when the fighting itself is over. In addi-
tion, the existence of mined areas can block the
process of returning refugees to their homes. The
fact that mines are relatively cheap, in terms of
their destructive effect, encour4ges the parties to
a conflict to use them extensively, particularly in
Africa. The effect of the excessive use of anti-
personnel mines can be seen in Angola and Mo-
zambique where large tracts of land have been
rendered uninhabitable despite the fact, in the
case of Mozambique, that political stability has
been restored. The cost of neutralising these
weapons makes it impossible for African coun-
tries to take effective action on their own.
Moreover, mine*learing requires sophisticated
equipment and expertise. In view of the scale of
the task, Africa needs our support. There are a
number of ways in which WEU could take action
in this field. Many of its member states have
gained practical experience in mine-clearing op-
erations, particularly in Africa (Angola, Eritrea,
Mozambique and Somalia). The main focal
points for action, as approved by the WEU
Council of Ministers in Ostend, are as follows:
provide information and advice to the
authorities conducting a demining op-
eration;
provide military training and advice in
order to train instructors and help de-
velop local capabilities;
disseminate information and maintain
contacts with other institutions and
bodies engaged in mine-clearing opera-
tions.
102. Measures such as these could be imple-
mented on the basis of the Petersberg Declara-
tion, in support of action taken by the European
Union, United Nations or any other international
organisation, for instance the OAU, or under
civilian humanitarian programmes. ln accordance
with the Ministers' Ostend Declaration, WEU
could take a more active part in mine-clearing
operations both in military terms (by opening up
safe routes) and humanitarian terms (through the
systernatic clearance of mines). The relevant
WEU bodies, mainly the Planning Cell in this
case, could draw up an inventory of member
states' capabilities, encourage and coordinate
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their initiatives and circulate the relevant data to
countries or bodies requesting information. The
agreement signed in Brussels on 22 April 1999
between WEU and Croatia at the request of the
European Council could serve as a model for
mine-clearing operations in African countries.
103. The problem now is how to become more
actively involved. While our desire to strengthen
African peacekeeping capabilities is to be en-
couraged, it must not serve as an excuse for
Europe to reduce its commitnents to Africa.
X. Problems involved in peacekeeping
(a) The role of the United Ndions
104. Since 1989 half the UN peacekeeping
operations have been conducted on the Afncan
continent. For all the promises of an "African
renaissance", the 1990s have been plagued by
war with its catalogue of massacres and misery.
But can the UN really be blamed for weakness
and a lack of resolve? While it has come in for a
great deal of criticism, the UN has also had a
measure of success, for example in Namibia and
Mozambique. ln most instances where there has
been failure, it was probably due to a lack of will
on the part of those involved rather than to any
malfunctioning in the United Nations.
105. In the majority of cases, the Security
Council invokes the provisions of Chapter M of
the UN Charter w'hich presupposes that the par-
ties to a dispute will genuinely wish to bring any
fighting to an end. ln the absence ofsuch resolve,
peacekeeping forces can be no more than observ-
ers with no power to act unless the Council de-
cides to "maintain or restore" peace (Chapter MI
of the UN Charter).
106. However, this solution has its limits as
conflicts in Africa have shown. The failure of the
LiN mission in Somalia made the Security
Council very reluctant to take up such an option
again. The operation never succeeded in disarm-
ing the warring parties despite the deployrnent of
an impressive number of troops from armed
forces that are among the most modern in the
world. ln addition, UN blue helrnet troops were
killed and the way in which some other
peacekeeping soldiers behaved came in for severe
criticism. This failure, which left the United Na-
tions deeply shocked, does much to explain why
the Council was so reluctant to take any action
dunng the Rlvandan crisis in 1994. The opera-
tion in Somalia also showed that any peace-en-
forcement missions require a clear mandate set-
ting out specific objectives.
107. The UN's operations in Somalia and
Rwanda were nonetheless a success in humani-
tarian terms with many lives saved. However, as
far as peacekeeping proper is concerned, any
intervention without the agreement of the parties
to a dispute has proved to be an extremely sensi-
tive matter especially where the issues do not
justifu the effort involved in mobilising consider-
able resources. ln such circumstances it is hard
to persuade public opinion that soldiers' lives
should be put at risk rn countries where the is-
sues at stake appear confused and have limited
scope, particularly in the case of Africa where
the terrain is difficult and suited to guerrilla ac-
tivity.
108. Scenes of horror never fail to generate
legitimate outrage and a call for armed interven-
tion to enforce peace but here again the issues, as
seen from the point of view of individual coun-
tries, are out of all proportion to the resources
that must be deployed to have any positive effect.
Furthermore, public opinion clamours for troops
be brought home at virtually the first sign of any
loss of life. In point of fact, such operations,
though conducted on behalf of the international
community, always entail war with all its human,
material and financial sacrifices. Very often then,
the main problem the Security Council faces is a
lack of will on the part of its member states to
accept the consequences. Even where that will
exists, the complexity and ambiguity of African
crises hold up decisions and prevent the interna-
tional community from acting swiftly.
109. The Security Council's reluctance to have
recourse to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is
therefore understandable and the United Nations
generally opts for Chapter M: securing a peace
agreement between the parties and deploying a
small force to ensure compliance with it, But this
brings us back to the question of whether the
parties to a dispute really want peace, since a
retum to stabilrty depends on the answer. Never-
theless, there is no denying that the difficulties
the Security Council faces in taking an initiative
are due not so much to the decision-making pro-
cedure itself as to a lack of political will.
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I10. Clearly, the United Nations and the pow-
ers with a traditional involvement in Africa are
deterred from taking action by the sheer scale of
such operations and prefer to leave it to the Afri-
can countries to take the initiative given that the
security of the continent is first and foremost an
African responsibility and is in their own interest.
However, it is important for the United Nations
not to give the impression that it is abandoning
Africa, particularly since it has lost credibility
there owing to the failure of its Angola mission.
(b) African peacekeeping initiativ es
111. The African countries are keen to play a
bigger peacekeeping role while it would suit the
United Nations to be less involved. In the early
1990s, the OAU set up a Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution and
ECOWAS established the first all-African peace-
keeping force (ECOMOG). These initiatives are
consistent with Chapter MII of the UN Charter
and have been supported by the United Nations2T.
In addition, in 1996 France, the United Kingdom
and the United States offered their support for
the procedure for strengthening African peace-
keeping capabilities.
ll2. Over and above the practical requirements
already mentioned, there are many questions still
to be answered when it comes to African peace-
keeping forces. The first concerns the OAU,
which has been left on the sidelines in the main
African peacekeeping initiatives so far. These
have instead been taken either by subregional
organisations (such as ECOMOG in Sierra
Leone) or by ad hoc groups of states (MISAB).
Also, although the OAU has led a large number
of mediation missions on a diplomatic level, the
parties in the various African crises seem to
prefer having their views heard in other bodies.
l13. This state of affairs is all the more regret-
table in that impartiality, which is essential for
the purposes of peacekeeping, is not always en-
demic to subregional organisations, and this is
even truer in the case of military units which
come from countries bordering on crisis areas
and participate in peacekeeping missions.
ECOMOG, for instance, is sometimes accused of
being a front for Nigerian hegemony. lnterven-
tion in Sierra Leone has led to rivalry between
-' 
s"" tn" reports of Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995)
and Koh Annan (1998) to the Security Council.
Nigeria, which supplies troops for ECOMOG
and advocates a military solution, and other
states (C6te d'Ivoire and Togo) which do not
contribute to the force and are in favour ofa dip-
lomatic solution. While some countries (Liberia
and Burkino Faso) accuse Nigerian troops of
committing acts of cruelty, the Nigerian Govem-
ment claims those same countries are supporting
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). ln your
Rapporteur's opinion, this type of intervention
should take place in a UN and OAU framework
with a view to guaranteeing impartiality and
preventing interference. South African interven-
tion in Lesotho, which was based on the SADC
treaty but also caused tension in the region, was
a response to the same concern for legitimacy
and impartiality. It can be infened from all this
that rvhat needs to be done is to strengthen the
authority of the pan-African organisation, but
this does not depend on the Africans themselves.
The instrument exists but there has to be a desire
to use it. Nevertheless, the fact that the OAU
central decision-making body takes decisions by
consensus is clearly not conducive to the organi-
sation's being able to take action swiftly. The
international community can do nothing to help
the OAU and its member states in this respect as
the underlying cause of the problem is a question
of political rvill.
ll4. Yet the Africans do seem to have a prefer-
ence for the subregional framework. For as long
as this is the case, any action by subregional
organisations should be taken on the basis of a
mandate issued by the UN Security Council in
order to guarantee its legitimacy. The same
questions can also be asked about operations
conducted by groups of states such as MISAB.
While such initiatives are to be encouraged in
every sense, the intemational community should
nevertheless ensure they have a proper basis.
I 15. Last but not least, the process of strength-
ening African peacekeeping capabilities raises
the question of the role of armies in Africa. For
many years, and this is still the case today, the
national armies of African countries have had a
destabilising influence on the continent either
because they have upheld despotic regimes or
supported rebel movements. Today, some find
themselves involved in peacekeeping missions. A
great deal of awareness-raising work, training
and education is needed to ensure that these
forces comply with peacekeeping requirements
26
DOCUMENT 1648
and observe human rights. What must not be
allowed to happen is for them to use the equip-
ment they receive as part of the effort to streng-
then African peacekeeping capabilities in order to
turn against the civilian authorities and over-
throw the govemment. While such a comment
may seem trivial, the danger of such a possibility
occurring is all too real.
116. Under British and Portuguese aid plans,
assistance and funding for African countries
should therefore be used to educate and reform
their armies so that they acquire a more healthy
respect for human rights and democracy. Simi-
larly, under the French plan, equipment is to be
provided but for the time being will be stored
under the supervision of French armed forces and
made available to African troops only for spe-
cific operations lasting for a limited period. Once
a mission ends, the equipment is to be handed
back. While the strengthening of African peace-
keeping capabilities is therefore to be encour-
aged, it is by no means the answer to all the
problems. The Africans continue to need the sup-
port of the intemational community in general
and Europe in particular. Their armed forces still
have too little experience ofpeacekeeping opera-
tions and need assistance and training from
countries with the proper expertise to prevent
things getting out of hand.
ll7. For the United Nations to want the Afri-
cans to become more involved in the security of
their continent is a good thing. The African
countries should be encouraged and supported in
their desire to do so. This means that the interna-
tional community must not leave Africa to cope
wittr what is a huge task on its own. The institu-
tional machinery exists and must be improved,
particularly as regards the OAU which should be
able to act as a guarantor of peace and democ-
racy in Africa. Good intentions apart, the Afri-
cans have virtually no other means of making
headway in what will inevitably be a lengthy
process. It is therefore important for those inten-
tions not to be frustrated by Europe, which is in a
position to provide the equipment and financial
and political support necessary to improve the
Africans'lot.
XI. Conclusions
ll8. The need for Europe to have a coordi-
nated, coherent, dynamic and realistic policy on
Africa is widely recognised. This was the mes-
sage that emerged from debates at the Lisbon
Colloquy and from all the talks your Rapporteur
had with OAU officials in Addis Ababa and
Brussels, representatives of the WEU Secretariat-
General and a number of European and African
politicians. It is also clear that a European policy
on Africa has to take account of the continent's
requirements for the purposes of promoting the
wellbeing of its peoples, peace, human rights and
economic and social development, supporting the
process of democratisation and last but not least
strengthening African security and peacekeeping
capabilities. Under no circumstances should such
support help to keep totalitarian regimes in
power against the will of the vast majority of the
people, who are exploited in favour of small
minorities. Consequently, a European policy re-
quires first and foremost some degree of coor-
dination 
- 
starting with a meeting of minds 
-
between the European Union and WEU and also
between the activities of WEU and the remark-
able efforts made by the OAU. It goes without
saying that all this work should be legitimated by
the United Nations. Furthermore, it is very im-
portant to remember that a European policy on
Africa should under no circumstances take ac-
count solely of European or even African inter-
ests. The universal concept of human rights and
the right of each individual to live, inter alia, tn
freedom and digruty must without question form
the basis of any European policy worthy of its
n.Lme even if, at the same time, it also serves
what Europe and its constituent states consider to
be their main and well founded interests.
119. Fortunately, there are now many ways in
which WEU can take practical steps to cooperate
with African peacekeeping forces. In the first
place, its Satellite Centre could provide the intel-
ligence that is essential for OAU crisis monitor-
ing and plaruring. WEU's considerable experi-
ence in the field of mine clearing could also be
used to help Africans in their fight against the
proliferation of landmines, which continue to in-
flict terrible damage, especially on unsuspecting
civilians and above all on children. Part of the
resources Europe has for training both peace-
keeping forces and police forces in Africa could
quite easily be made available to the sub-Saharan
states under the auspices of WEU. Logistic
support and a degree of supervision of African
forces by the European military could also be
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envisaged, again under WEU auspices, with a
view to helping improve the level of training. In
short, there are numy possibilities for cooper-
ation.
120. The political need for and practical feasi-
bility of Euro-African cooperation has not gone
unnoticed in the WEU Council of Ministers. The
Ostend and Rhodes Declarations gave the im-
pression that the Ministers wanted WEU to em-
bark on a process of implementing a tangible and
realistic African policy in accordance with the
principles and mandates of the United Nations
and working in conjunction with the OAU as its
main partner. But it would seem that nothing has
come of this as yet. Africa appears to have been
forgotten in the most recent declarations issued
by the WEU Ministers, particularly at Bremen.
Moreover, your Rapporteur has learnt that a
number of member states have not even informed
the Secretariat-General of the content of their aid
prograrnmes for Africa. This is all the more re-
gretiable given that liaison between the various
progrimrmes under the auspices of WEU, entail-
ing a definition of clear objectives and avoiding
duplication, would enable those states to provide
more specific and effective assistance and there-
fore to be seen, in the eyes of their own public as
well, to be more involved in African issues.
l2l. ln your Rapporteur's view it is time to
stop dithering. We readily acknowledge that the
development of a European policy designed to
strengthen security in Africa, contribute to the
process of democratisation, ecomomic and social
development, modernisation and better organisa-
tion in African countries, and create the institu-
tions which underpin a civilian society is beyond
the possibilities of WEU as an organisation. But
WEU does have the practical resources and is
under an obligation, as Europe's sole security
and defence organisation, to help build a safer,
more stable and humane Africa. In so doing, it
would be defending Europe's legitimate interests
rvhile at the same time acting in accordance with
Africa's own wishes. It is up to our Organisation
not to shirk the responsibilities assigned to it by
history.
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